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ABSTRACT
The starting point of this study is the proposition that
intensive formation of human capital on the job is the basic
proximate reason for the strong degree of worker attachment to the
firm in Japan. The greater emphasis on training and retraining,
much of it specific to the firm, results also in steeper wage
trajectories, due to growth of skills in the firm.
We explore this insight more thoroughly by a detailed use of
micro—data for the two countries: We measure wage profiles and
turnover in age groups, and we test the inverse relation between
the two on industry sectors within each of the countries.
Using productivity growth indexes for industries in the U.S.
and in Japan we test the hypothesis that rapid technical change
which induces greater and continuous training, is responsible for
steeper profiles, hence indirectly for lesser turnover. The
hypothesis is confirmed on the sectoral level in both countries.
Finally, we try to standardize for the cultural background of
workers, by observing a sample of Japanese plants in the U.S. which
employ American workers, and use Japanese labor policies in
recruitment and training. We find that the steeper tenure—wage
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1. Introduction
The relation between labor mobility, orturnover, and the structure of wages, especially
by age, seniority and skill level, is a subject of research in theU.S. and a topic of lively interest
in the analyses of Japanese labor markets. Inparticular, theories of human capital investment in
worker skills and in hiring and screening have been usedto explain tenure and experiencewage
profiles and to link them to turnover patterns across workers. Thislinkage, which we shall refer
to as the duality hypothesis,1 has been invoked by several researchers2to explain the very low
Japanese turnover rate, often portrayed as a product of the "lifetimeemployment system."
Although hard estimates are not readily available, it is well known that laborpolicies of Japanese
firms involve a strong emphasis on recruitment forjobs, and training plus retraining of workers.
The greater volume and greater firm specificity of such humancapital investments in Japan than
in the U.S. is claimed to be the central, proximatereason for the large differences in the degree of
attachment to the firm in the two countries.
Our research is guided by the same hypothesis: Putbriefly, larger investments in workers
on the job result in steeper tenure-wage profiles and, givena degree of specificity in each unit of
human capital, turnover is smaller thesteeper the profile, This is a testable proposition in
contexts other than the U.S.-Japan comparison, and wereport on such tests by industry sectors
within the two countries.
Of course, observed dualities of this sort need not arise fromspecific human capital
alone. Wage-tenure profiles may be steepened,independently of skill formation, to deter
shirking,3 or to deter worker quit in order to amortize fixedcosts of employment, such as
recruitment and training costs. If training costs are important andrecruitment efforts are related to
training needs,4 the fixed costs and specific capital hypothesesoverlap, and may be treated as
one.
To the extent that the reputation of Japanese workers forloyalty and discipline can be
ascribed to their cultural background in upbringing and in historicaltradition, steeper wage
profiles in Japan are not likely to reflect greater needs to deter shirking.Moreover, contrary to the
monitoring model5 in which steep profiles substitute for greater supervision, there isa great deal
of supervision in Japan, but it is largely a matter of guidance andtraining. As Koike (1984)
describes it: A young recruit who joins a workgroup, following a period of (orientation)
training, "is usually backed up by the sub-foreman for a period of several months. Evenafter that
he is instructed and attended by a senior worker whooccupies the next position in the rotation2
sequence." Indeed, Koike remarks, "the foreman in Japaneselabor markets is much more
involved than his Western counterpart in a worker's career."
It may, of course, be argued that the cultural traits of Japaneseworkers which obviate the
need to deter shirking are sufficient to explain low turnoverbehavior or the so-called "life-time
employment system." Although it may well be a facilitatingcondition, cultural background has
long historical roots, but very low turnoverin the labor market appears to be a modern day
phenomenon in Japan. Although the evidenceis incomplete, there are indications that major
declines in turnover accompanied the onset of rapid economic growthin Japan in the early
1950's.6 Fig. 1 shows that in manufacturing the turnover rate is significantlylower in the recent
decades than in the interwar period.
We think that the timing is not coincidental. We also think thatthe nature of training
processes and of policies in Japanesefirms, which makes the specific human capital hypothesis
particularly useful, derives in part from the contextof rapid economic growth. There is evidence
in U.S. data that rapid productivity growth promotes trainingand retraining, by increasing its
profitability.7 In addition, the special emphasis on training for job flexibilityand rotation in
Japanese firms8 strongly suggest a policy geared tothe progressive introduction and absorption
of technological improvements. To the extent that the adaptations varyacross firms, greater
specificities are generated in human capital investments onthe job.
This study is an attempt to deepen our understanding of the Japaneselabor market, by
comparing it with the U.S. labor market. We takethe differences in on-the-job skill formation of
workers as the central source of differences in wage profilesand in turnover behavior, while
placing the skill formation and related labor policiesin the context of economic growth and
technological change.
In section (2) we use micro-data for both countries, not previouslyemployed for this
purpose, to contrast the twonational labor markets, as well as to test the wage growth-turnover
duality at the sectoral (industry) level within thecountries. In section (3) we trace inter-country
differences in labor policies to differences in rates ofeconomic growth or technical change. We
utilize information on productivity growth by industrial sectors to assesseffects on training and
on shapes of wage profiles. We also explore corollaryevidence on the effects of rapid economic
growth on depreciation (obsolescence) ofhuman capital and on mandatory retirement age. In
section (4) we compare the wage-turnover relation in a sampleof Japanese firms employing
American workers in the U.S. with the relation in comparableAmerican firms, and in the general
Japanese and U.S. labor markets. This comparisonis expected to reveal the effects of differential
labor policies, net of differences in cultural backgroundsof workers which are often emphasized

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2. The human capital duality hypothesis and themicro-evidence
That greater volumes of job training imply steeper wage profiles,on the job, and over
longer work experience is a theoremin human capital analysis. A similar theorem predicts a
negative effect of job training on turnover, onthe plausible assumption that larger volumes of
training contain also more firm-specific training, evenif the latter is not a fixed part of the
former.
Until recently, the absence of empirical measuresof job training has made much of the
human capital analysis of wage structures (Mincer,1974) and of its effects on mobility (Mincer
and Jovanovic, 1981) largely indirect. What wastestable was the relation between wage growth
and labor mobility, both of which are, according tothe theory, affected by job training. More
recently useful measures of job traininghave become available in U.S. micro-data sets, such as
the Current Population Survey (1983), recent panelsof the National Longitudinal Samples. and
the Panel Studies of Income Dynamk Directevidence on the effects of training on wage growth
has appeared in the research literature. Brown (1983),Parsons (1986), Tan (1987), and Mincer
(1984) all show evidence of the wage growtheffect in the cross-section and over time.9 In
particular, Brown and Mincer (separately)showed that when the tenure profile of wages was
decomposed into 3 segments in the PSID data, wages grewslowly before the training period,
rapidly during the training period,and levelled off after it. Training periods were defmed as
months and years during which training occurred.An additional year with training raised wage
growth in tl' rirm by 4-5% over the year,in cross-sections and over time.
The effects of training on mobility are exploredin Mincer (1984) using the PSID data
panel of working men: An additional yearwith training reduces the separation rate of workers by
over 1%, while it lengthens the completedduration of tenure in the firm in which training is
received by less than a year at younger ages and by morethan a year at older ages. These effects
hold for workers with the same education, experience,marital status, union status, and health.
The same study shows that more educated andmarried men tend to receive more training,10
which also helps to explain why turnover is lowerfor more educated and married workers.
We proceed to estimate wage functions in U.S.and in Japanese national sample micro-
data, in order to derive experience and tenure-wageprofiles for otherwise similar workers in the
two countries and in (over 20)industrial sectors in each country. Mobility behavior isthen
estimated on the same data using the same independentvariables for standardization. Tests of the
duality hypothesis--that turnover is inverselyrelated to tenure-wage growth--are then performed
at the sectoral levels.1a' Wage Functions in Japanese and U. S. Micro-data.
Our data is drawn from the 1979 JapaneseEmployment Structure Survey (ESS) and jj
U.S.Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for theperiod 19768111. The Japanese sample
consists of male employees from 15years of age through 55.Thesample surveyed in the 1979 Eismade of about 330 thousand households. A sample of 21,140male employees (about 10
percent of the total) was selected at random. Because E does not provide direct information
about the hourly wage rate, we substitute the ratio
Annual earning from main job
Annual working hours in main job
for it.12 The U.S. (PSID) sample Consists ofover 7,000 observations on white males, heads of
household (ages 1860),13 who were employed during eachsurvey. The real wage rate in the
main job was deflated by the 1979-based CPI. Maritalstatus (M), union membership (U), and
the dummy of job changes (C) are entered as independentvariables in addition to education,
experience, and tenure. In the U.S. equation, year dummies are addedto eliminate aggregate
wage changes over time. Due to lack of exact information aboutyears of schooling in ESS, 9
years is selected if the person is a junior high school graduate, 12years if a senior high school
graduate, and 16 years if a college graduate or beyond. Total workexperience is calculated for
both countries as the employee'sage minus his years of school completed minus 6 (the
elementary school entrance age).
The estimated wage function is of the form:
(1)lnw=a0+cz1 E+a2E2+a3X+a4X2+aST+T2÷a7Z
Here, the human capital variables are E-years of schooling, X-years of workexperience, and T-
years of tenure in the firm. As these are expressed in time units, wages are expressed in
logarithms, and the coefficients measure rates of increases inwages with E, X, and T
respectively. 14
TableAl shows means and standard deviations of variables forJapan and the U.S.
Average current tenure in the employing firm is 3.5 years longer in Japan, and theaverage annual
separation rate is over 3 times greater in the U.S. Other differences are small.Wage functions are
shown in Table A2 for all, younger workers (up toage 30) and older workers (over 30) for the
U.S. and Japan.
The coefficients in Table A2 show the usual signs in allgroups, except for differing signs
of the quadratic on education in the U.S. (positive) and Japan (negative).15As described in
equations (A), where tenure is not included, wages grow with experience over twiceas rapidly in
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Japan than in the U.S. But when tenure is added,the experience coefficients are reduced in both
countries, but more drastically in Japan. This indicates thatthe growth of wages with experience
are in large part due to growth of wages with tenure,especially in Japan. The inference is that
larger volumes of human capital, largely of afirm specific nature, are accumulated in Japan.
Other important differences emerge in the complete equations (C),where age groups are
compared: Growth of wages with tenure is similarin both countries in the younger age group;
the big difference--and steeper slope in Japan--is evidentin the older (>30) age group. Put
another way, there is little if any decline in wage growth inthe firm as age advances in Japan,
compared to a large decline in the U.S. The human capitalinterpretation is that on-the-job
training processes are much more continuous, more evenlydistributed over working age in
Japan.
The summary Table (1) below shows the partial derivatesof (log) wages with respect to
education, experience, and tenure based on wage equationsin Tables A2. These were calculated
at common (average) levels of the independentvariables, and show the much steeper tenure-
wage trajectories in Japan compared tothe U.S. in the national micro-data samples.
Table 1
Growth of Wages with Education. Experience and Tenure
All Age Group
Japan U.S. U.S.
Equation Type (C) (C) (D)
Schooling 12 years 17.05% 6.45 6.94
Experience 17 years 0.65 0.95 0.63
Tenure 9 years 4.19 1.22 1.01
Young Age Group
Schooling 12 years 15.63 5.78 6.27
Experience 6 years 2.25 1.94 1.91
Tenure 3 years 3.72 3.91 3.18
Old Age Group
Schooling 12 years 17.70 6.48 6.94
Experience 23 years 0.66 0.50 0.32
Tenure 12 years 4.07 1.13 0.916
Note on the interpretation of the coefficients in thewage functions.
The human capital interpretation of the coefficients in thewage functions requires a little
more elaboration: In principle (Mincer, 1974), the coefficients of experience, and oftenure reflect
(multiplicatively) rates of return to the respective investments, volumes of them (measuredas
ratios to labor costs, or time-equivalents of training costs), and therate of decline of such
investments over time. It is sufficient, for ourpurpose in this note to look at the linear
coefficients: Thus, the linear coefficient of experience X in (A) of Table A2equals rx Kox,
where rx is the rate of return to post-school investments,including general and specific job
investments, indexed by the initial investment ratio K0,assumedto decline linearly over
experience. Similarly, the coefficient of tenure (T) in Table 2 equalsrr K0T with corresponding
interpretation for specific investments in the firm, given that X is in the equation.
Since the rate of return to schooling (Ta) measured as is over twice as high in Japan
than in the U.S. (in Table 1), and the same is true of coefficients of X and ofT, it may be true
that volumes of job training (measured by K0 for totaltraining, and by K0T for specific
training) are similar in both countries, but that the rate of return on it is over twiceas high in
Japan.
Even in this case the implication for turnover of the over twicesteeper tenure-wage
profile in Japan would still be the same, since returns (to workers and employers) froma unit of
investment would be increasing more rapidly in Japan, providing agreater deterrent to turnover.
Judging, however, by fragmentary evidence on the comparative prevalence16 andon ratios of job
training (and recruitment) costs to labor costs in Japanese and American firms (see section4), an
emphasis on differences in both magnitudes and efficiency of job training is probablycorrect.
(b' Turnover Functions
We proceed to estimate turnover functions in Table A3,corresponding to the wage
functions in Table A2.
One purpose in estimating turnover functions is tocompare turnover rates in the U.S. and
Japan for similar workers, by adjusting for worker characteristics specified in the turnover
equations. Another is to observe, in the light of the specific capital hypothesis, differencesor
similarities in the effects of education, experience, and tenure on turnover. Forexample, a
stronger positive relation between schooling and job training, which is partly specific, should
lead to a stronger negative relation between education and turnover. Of particular interest is the7
relation between tenure in the firm and turnover: The more specific training heaccumulates in the
firm, the longer the worker is likely to stay with the firm. The largerthe volume of training and
the more it is bunched in early tenure the bigger the decline in the separation as tenure lengthens.
Moreover, the less intensive the screening of workers before hiring,the more important is job
matching after hire, hence the bigger the separation ratein early tenure. Consequently, the decline
in separations with tenureis steeper, the less prior screening, the larger the volume of
training, and the shorter the period of training in the firm, giventhe volume.
Also, a decline in turnover (s) should be observed as age (experience, X)advances since
dS_as dT as (2)—+<
because<0, as already suggested, while >0 (it would be zero, if turnover were
instantaneous) and ,theeffect of "pure aging" (given tenure), is also likely to be negative, as
costs of moving increase with age, apart from specific capital reasons.If "pure aging" is
unimportant, as seems to be the case, the main reason for a negative ageeffect
<0, is the negative tenure effect,<0.
Table A3 utilizes U.S. data in the PSID for the period, 1976-81, as in the wage equation.
But, because the data on firm tenure in the previous jobis not available in the 1979 ESS, the
Japanese sample is drawn from the 1982 ESS.The samples are male employees of the same age
group as in the wage equation including part-timeand temporary workers in both countries. In
this paper we defme labor mobility by whether the worker changesfirms during the past year.
We exclude exits from and entries into the labor market. Consequently, job separationis
synonymous with job change in ourdata.
The table shows regressions of turnover rates for each country and for age groups.The
dependent variable in each equation is denoted as unityif the employee changed firm during the
past year, and zero if the employee stayedwithin the same firm. Independent variables such as
experience, tenure, and industry are defined on theinformation in the previous years of the
survey period. The negative effectof schooling on separations is observable in both countries.
This is due to a positive correlation between schooling and training, arelation consistent with the
theory of investment in human capital over the life-cycle, orwith complementarity between the
two. The relation is a bit weaker in the U.S., but it gets strongerat higher levels of schooling.
The experience effect, where tenure is not included, is negative and convex (i.e.,it decelerates),
with a steeper decline in the U.S. data. This is induced by the patternof tenure coefficients as
seen in equations (B), according to the decompositionof shown above. The larger negativecoefficients on X (without tenure) are due to thelarger coefficients on T (given X). It is
surprising, at first glance, to fmd that the decline of separations withtenure is slower in Japan
than in the U.S. However, the more intensive recruitmentand pre-hiring screening effort in
Japan (see section 4) means that separations are reduced in theimmediate post-hiring period, and
the spreading out of training activities overlonger periods of tenure implies that the decline of
separations with tenure is rather slow. Indirect evidenceon the spreading Out of training (and
retraining) activities in Japan was noted in thewage profiles of Table A2: Tenure wage profiles
continued to grow for senior workers in Japan, while theirslopes decline much more in the
U.S., hence the difference in the steepness ofwage growth between the countries was much
more pronounced among older workers. It is also possible that the flatterJapanese tenure-
separation profile is, in part, due to an often assertedgreater homogeneity of Japanese workers.
The same heterogeneity bias17 would alsoapply to the tenure-wage profile, biasing it downward
for Japan. Apparently, the bias is of littleconsequence in the inter-countly comparison, as the
Japanese wage-profile is so much steeper, not flatter.
In order to estimate differences in separation ratesamong workers with similar
characteristics, we standardize by education, experience, and maritalstatus of common (average)
levels of these variables. The results are shown insummary Table (2):
Table 2
Adjusted andUnadjustedMean Turnover Rates (%)
Jppan
Adj Unadj Adj Unadj At X All 13.9 16.6 3.3 4.9 X=17
Young 28.4 28.1 8.1 8.6 X=6 Older 10.1 10.0 2.5 3.5 X=23
Source: Table A3, col (A).
Education is 12 years for all three groups.
It appears that the over threefold higher U.S. turnover rate shown inthe unadjusted data (Table
1), is true for similar workers as well.
(c) Sectoral Evidence on Wage Growth -TurnoverDualities.
While the steeper tenure-wage profile and lower turnover inJapan than in the U.S. is
consistent with the human capital induced duality, one such comparison doesnot by itself
represent compelling evidence. It is plausible that industrial sectors within the countries also
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differ in skill acquisition processes of their workers, given differences in productionfunctions. If
so, dualities could be tested across such sectors in bothcountries. We proceed to do this by
including industry dummies (for 24 industry sectors in Japan and 17 in the U.S.)in the micro-
data regressions previously shown without them in Tables A2 and A3. In the wage equations we
added an interaction variable IND x T, where T is the individual tenure variable. Its coefficient c,
measures differential slopes of the tenure-wage profiles by industry.The estimated parameters
are shown in Table A4. The aj coefficients measuring wage-tenure slopes appearto differ
significantly across industries in both countries. In the separation equationthe coefficient of
added industry dummies INTl)1 measures differential turnover by industry i ofworkers with the
same education, experience, marital status (and union membershipin the U.S.). The j
coefficientsalso shown in Table A4 are less significant (using 10% levels), especially in the
young age groups in the U.S. and in theolder age groups in Japan. The upper panel of Table 3
shows the correlations between a1 and in each country by age groups:
Table 3
Effects of Industry Tenure-Wage Slopes on Separation Rates
(A) Correlations between Industry Coefficients in Table A4
U.S. Japan





(B) Regression Coefficients of Industry Tenure-Wage Slopes (ail
and of Industry Wage Levels (ci,)inU.S. Separation Equations. 1976- 19811
Variables All Age ￿ 30 Age> 30 All Non-Union
ai -2.26 -1.50-.48-1.04-2.92 -2.89 -2.03
(2.9)(1.9) (.9)(1.8)(3.8) (3.7) (2.3)
-.23 -.22 -.13 -.20
(4.6) (2.3) (2.8) (2.8)
1Excludes agriculture and Construction which are highly seasonal.
Shown in Table A5.10
The U.S. correlation coefficient has a negative value inevery age group as predicted by
the duality hypothesis. The coefficients in the old-agegroup and the all-age group are statistically
significant at the 20 percent level. In the young-age group, where industries with significant
coefficients are few, the correlation coefficient is not significant. In contrast, the Japaneses
correlation coefficients are positive but insignificant in the old-age group.18 In theyoung age
group the coefficient has a significant negative value.
These results confirm the duality hypothesis, but the procedure of correlatingregression
coefficients tends to produce statistically weak (biased toward zero) correlations.
A better procedure is to introduce the industry tenure-wage slopes (aj)intothe separation
equation, previously shown in Table A3. We are able to do this in the U.S. data, and the results
are shown in Table 3, U.S. panel B. To the extent that industry wage levels also differ and
reflect barriers to mobility, such as unionization, we introduce both industry dummies(cx2) and
tenure-wage slopes (a1) in the equation. Both are negative and significant in the total sample and
in both age groups. The tenure-wage slope effects on turnover are muchstronger in the older age
group (suggesting greater finn specificity of accumulated skills than in the younger). Also, in
contrast to the level effect (coefficient of cz2) the tenure wage slope effect (coefficient of c) is
stronger in the non-union sector than in the total sample.
Since tenure-wage slopes are more likely to reflect training in the non-unionsector, we
can use the coefficient (-2.03) in the last column of Table 3, to estimate the extent to which
differences in tenure-wage slopes account for the differences in turnover rates between the U.S.
and Japan. According to our Table 1, tenure-wage growth per year is 1.2% in the U.S. and
4.2% in Japan, at average (9 years) tenure levels, for otherwise similar workers. Thus an
increase of 3.0% in the wage slopes should reduce the separation rate by -2.03 x 3.0 =-6.1%.
This would bring down the standardized U.S. rate from 13.9% to 7.8%, cutting the U.S.-Japan
differential in turnover rates by close to 60% of the gap.
3. Economic Growth. Human Capital. and Wages.
Why do labor policies of Japaneses firms emphasize human capital investments which
result in low turnover rates, or conversely, what explains the greater efforts of Japanese firms to
strengthen worker attachment?
Although Japan was already an industrial power with a relatively educated labor force
early in this century, the industrial relations system which produces low turnover became
especially prominent in the post World War II era. The successful effort to rebuild industrial11
plant, to catch up with Western technology and to continue improvements yielded a very rapid
rate of economic growth, initially capitalizing on the boom created by the Korean Warin the early
50's. The evolution of labor policies in the firms may be viewed as a response to and in
anticipation of rapid technological change. Introduction of new technologies requires
complementary, growing and changing worker skills on the job, as well as a strongbasic
educational system which promotes continued learning skills. Technology is not quite a public
good19, and its use is uncertain at any point. The result is considerable variation among firms in
the technologies they create and adapt, particularly in industries where technology is advancing
rapidly. Hence the emphasis on skill upgrading and remolding on the job,with strong elements
of specificity.
Whether or not firm specificities are inherent in technological change, in its face firms
must make choices: Should the present workers be retrained and reassigned to new ormodified
tasks, or should new workers be hired and trained while the old employees arelaid off? If
training is general, that is fully transferable, the firm is indifferent between hiring a newtrainee
and retraining and reassigning an old worker. It may prefer hiring new workers if new
technology is already embodied in skills outside the firm, or if newer vintagesof education are
helpful.2° But, to the extent that training is specific (including that which is conditioned by the
new technology), the firm will offer retraining and or continuousflexible training with rotation.
The resulting strong attachment of workers to firms and the avoidance of layoffs are
mutually profitable for workers and employees, according to the theoryof specific human
capital. Training for flexibility and job rotation are of particular importancein facilitating long-
term attachments in the face of changing technology. What is more,the perception of job securit'
eliminates worker resistance to technological change and encourages innovative contributions on
their part.21
If these arguments are correct, the steeper wage growth in the firm and the resulting
lower turnover in Japan compared to the U.S. can be attributed, at least in part, tothe differential
rates of economic growth in the two countries in the post-war decades.To test this proposition
we analyze several links between rates of productivity growthand behavior in the labor market.
Recent research in the U.S. (Lillard and Tan, 1986) reveals that job training is increased
in industries which experience more rapid long-term productivity growth. It alsoshows that in-
house training is encouraged while outside vocational training as well as prior on-the-job training
in other firms is de-emphasized in such industries.22 If these fmdings apply todifferences across
countries which differ in rates of economic (productivity) growth, the steeper tenure-wage
profiles in Japan and lower turnover would follow as a consequence.12
(a) Sectoral Evidence on Effects of Productivity Growth
Using indexes of total factor productivity growthconstructed by Conrad and Jorgenson
(1985) for about 30 U.S. and Japanese industries,we are able to test the predicted effects by
industry sector in each country.23 Table A6 shows these indexesfor both countries.As we have
more information in U.S. data, we can analyze themmore comprehensively, both in substance
and in form. Thus, we first inquire into evidence ofgreater demand for education and training in
sectors with greater productivity growth underlying thegreater use of human capital in such
industries. Panel A of Table 4 shows the effect oflong-term productivity growth on the incidence
of training, by education level. It is positive withoutthe interaction, as well, according to Lillard
and Tan (1986). Panel B shows the positive effects ofproductivity growth--both long and short-
term--on the profitability (returns) to education andtraining. This we see in the positive
coefficients of interactions of productivity growth indexes witheducation (PG x E) and with
training (PG x RQT) when they were included in the 1976-1981 PSIDwage equations. The
results indicate that the demand for education and fortraining increases as productivity grows, a
fact of great importance for the understanding of thelong-term growth of human capital in
growing economies, and of its very rapid growth in recentJapanese history.
Table 4
Effects of Productivity Growth in U.S Industrieson:
LA) The Incidence of Training by Education Level
Education <12 12 13-15 16 17+ Coefficient
ofPGxE 1.92 .41 2.88 3.56 5.32
All coefficients significant at 1% level.
Source: Lillard and Tan (1986).) Returnsto Education and Training
1960-1979 1970-1979









PG =Productivitygrowth over the periods
RQT =Trainingon the job, in years.
Source: PSID males, 1976-1981.
The first column uses longer-term productivity growth (P0)measured by the 1960 to
1979 increases in the indexes, the second--shorter term--overthe 1970 to 1979 period.
RQT is the measure of (years or months) of trainingreceived in the current job, reported
in 1976 and 1978 in the PSID.
We now proceed to test the effects of differential sectoral productivitygrowth on tenure-
wage slopes in each country.Table 5A shows results for Japan, obtained by regressing industry
tenure-wage slopes24 on indices of industry productivitygrowth.
Table 5A
Coefficients of Productivity Growth
in Industry Tenure-wage Slopes Regression
Japan (23 industries)1



























.240.167 .251 .243.048.248Table SB
Coefficients of Interaction of Productivity Growth (in 15 industries)1




























Although the results are not very strong, they do show that the more rapid long-term
productivity growth in the sector the steeper is the tenure-wage profile. This is true foryounger
and older workers, with a somewhat larger effect onwage slopes of older workers. Where the
shorter-mn productivity growth indices are included in the regressions,they are negative and not
significant. Apparently the wage structures induced by economic growth are fairly durable in the
short run. Adjustments, which may be expected when economic fortuneschange, take time.
We are able to implement the same test in U.S. data with a statisticallymore efficient
procedure. In Table SB we interact productivity rDwth indices with tenure in thewage equation.
,4&. 1 /,.. 'vc.I/i
Table6A
Regressions of Industry Turnover Rates
on Industry Productivity Growth
Japan (23 industries)1
























All (1x-6rn Young (lX. Older (31-6rn
R2________ .048 .033.050.301.296.311 .040.008.092
1See Table A6.15
As in Japan, the effects of long term productivity growth (1960-79) in theU.S. is to
steepen the tenure wage slopes. Here theeffects appear to be stronger among the young,
suggesting a lesser, if any, degree of obsolescencein the process of productivity growth in the
U.S. Perhaps this is plausible at the frontier of Western technology towhich Japan was catching
up during that period. Also, shorter term(1970-79) effects were not significant, and mixed when
included with long-term indices in the equations.
If the steepness of the tenure-wage slopes is increased by productivity growth, an
(indirect) effect of productivity growth on turnovershould also be visible. This is verified in
Tables 6A for Japan and 6B for the U.S.
In Table 6A, coefficients of industry dummies in the Japanese turnover equation are
regressed on long and short-run productivity growthindexes.
Table 6B






















Although negative signs prevail, they are significant onlyfor the younger group, where
turnover is more pronounced. For the older groups,the effect is even positive, contrary to
expectation. We return to this anomaly in the nextsection.
In the U.S. data we can perform the same test more efficiently by includingthe
productivity indexes directly in the turnover equation.
All (18-60) Young (18-30) Older (31-60)Table 7
Observed and Predicted
Tenure-Wage Slope





Observed Tenure-Wage Slope .011 .042 .031
Predicted (a) .011 .037 .026
(b) .032
The results shown in Table 6B are clear: Long term productivitygrowth reduces
turnover, in both age groups indirectly via the effects on training and oncorresponding tenure-
wage growth. A comparison of Tables 5B and 6B shows clearly the symmetric (or duality)
effects of productivity growth on wage slopes and on turnover. Thelong-run PG positive effects
on wage slopes are bigger for the younger group, and so are the negative effectson turnover.
The shorter run PG. when included, has negative effects on thewage slopes of young (in 5B)
and positive effects on turnover (in 6B). At any rate, the shorter-run effectsattenuate the long run
effects. It appears that, in the short run adjustments to more rapidproductivity growth involve
substituting more educated for less educated workers without reduction in turnover. In thelonger
run, in-house training and reduced turnover dominate.
Returning to Table 5 we can ask the question posed at the outset of this section: To what
extent does the more rapid economic growth in Japan account for thesteeper wage profiles
there?
According to the U.S. data (Table 5B) the effect of adding a unit of long-term growth
(measured by the interaction variable (PG x Tenure) is to add 1.4% to thetenure-wage slope.
The mean value of (PG x Tenure) in the U.S. was .625. Since Japaneseproductivity growth was
4 times as rapid over the period, the corresponding mean value forJapan was 2.500. The
predicted difference in tenure-wage growth was therefore (2.500-.625) x 1.4 =2.62%,using the
U.S. Table, or 2.06% using the Japanese Table. As thesummary Table 7 indicates, the
differences in productivity growth account for 70% to 80% of the differences intenure-wage
slopes in the two economies.
We do not carry out a similar calculation for each agegroup separately, because the
effects of productivity growth on wage profiles are much larger foryoung than for older workers
in the U.S. (Table 5A) but no smaller for the latter in Japan (5B). This observation, callsfor a
closer look at the labor market consequences of obsolescence which accompaniesrapid changes
in technology.
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(b) Obsolescence. Life-time Distribution of Training, and EarlyRetirement
One effect of rapid changes in technology is an increased depreciation of physicaland of
human capital, due to obsolescence. In effect, the pay off period of investmentsin human capital
is shortened. Hence less is invested at any given time, but investments (training) are repeated
over the working life.25 Since the investments do notdecline much over the working life,wage
profiles do not decelerate much. To the extent that trainingis specific, and it is plausible that such
specificity is accentuated by firms' adaptations to technology,the lack of deceleration is
pronounced in tenure-wage profiles. We saw evidence of thislack of deceleration in Japanese
data, contrasted with significant declines in tenure-wage slopes atolder ages in the U.S. We also
saw, in part (a) of this section, that effectsof productivity growth on steepness of wage profiles
was no smaller for older than for younger workersin Japan, but much smaller in the U.S.
Apparently, the overall much weaker growth rate in theU.S. did not involve obsolescence, or
potential obsolescence as much as in Japan.
Despite the greater potential obsolescence, total volumes of training areincreased in
conditions of rapid productivity growth as was indicated in part (a), presumablybecause of the
greater profitability (indicated by positivecoefficients PG xRQT in Table 4) of the up-to-date
training. We should note, of course, that obsolescence of human capitaldoes not necessarily
imply obsolescence of workers. By gradual adjustmentsin continuous training, with emphasis
on flexibility and job rotation, potential obsolescenceis overcome without changing much of the
work force in the firm.
However, workers who interrupt their work experience for a long period, aremuch more
handicapped when returning to work in a regime of rapid technical changethan in one where
changes are milder. One way to gauge the differencein rates of potential obsolescence of worker
skills in Japan compared to the U.S. is to observe the rate of decline in wage ratesof persons
who drop out of the labor force for a prolonged period. Such estimates areavailable for the U.S.
(Mincer & Polachek 1974 and 1978), Sweden (Gustafsson, 1977)and for Japan (Higuchi,
1987), for married women who withdraw from the laborforce (usually for child-bearing and
child-rearing purposes). While such interruptions are nowmuch less frequent in the U.S., they
were still pronounced in the late sixties periodcovered by Mincer and Polachek in the U.S., and
by Gustafsson in Sweden.
The estimates of depreciation "through non-use" are provided by theco-efficient & in the
wage function of the followingform:
ln w= a0 +a1E+a2 X+a3T +31)18
Here X measures actual work experience in thelabor market, T- the most recentjob tenure, and
D the length of interruptions of workactivity, all in years. The "depreciation" coefficienton D is
in part due to "forgetting" or erosion of skillsused in the market prior to interruption.But, even
without "forgetting," skills become obsolete ifthey are rapidly modified in the market place when
technology changes rapidly. This obsolescence effectought to have been greater in Japan than in
the U.S. Indeed, estimates of the depreciationcoefficient (ö) in married women'swage functions
shown in Table 8 are clearly larger inJapanese data than in U.S. or Sweden.
Note also, that the estimated depreciationrates tend to increase with level of education.
This would be expected if retrainingon the job is complementary with education and with
technical change--a hypothesis consistent withour findings in this study.
The estimates are not quite comparable interms of procedures, time periods, and data
sources. Nevertheless, they represent a strong suggestion thatobsolescence is an important
additional component to "forgetting" in Japan,augmenting the depreciation of skills which are
not used over several years (the length of interruptionperiods are similar in the two sets of data).
Another implication of rapid technologicalchange which necessitates continuing training
and retraining of workers, is an adverse effecton continuing employment of older workers. This
could happen if it is more difficult, that ismore costly, to retrain older workers, while at thesame
time, the low turnover rates throughout primeages result in a disproportionate number of such
workers in sectors with rapid technical change.Early mandatory retirement from the job--though
not from the labor force, and not necessarily from the firm--isa solution apparently practiced in
Japan.
A weak test of this hypothesis is performed inTable 9. Here we relate the incidence (in %
of firms) with mandatory retirement (Y1)and, alternatively, the average age of uniform
mandatory retirement (Y2), in 9 industrial sectors (aggregated fromthe larger numbers used
before), to long-term productivity growth by sector (X1) andto tenure-wage slopes for the (31-
55)agegroups by sector (X2). The X's are used alternatively; they cannot be usedjointly, since
they are strongly correlated on this highly aggregative level,as we would expect.(a) All married workers
(b) Married women with children
(c) Women with interrupted careers
Table 8
Depreciation Rates in Wage Functions
of Married Women (%'
Table9
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Productivity Growth (Xi), Wage-Slopes (Xand EarlyRetirement1üiX










1 Datasource: 1980 Survey on Employment Management,the Japanese Ministry of Labor.
Y1=the incidence (in % of firms) with mandatoryretirement.
Y2=the average age of uniform mandatory retirement.
As the results show, sectors with more rapid productivity growth (Xi)tend to have
mandatory retirement rules, and an earlier retirement age.The same is true of sectors with steeper
tenure-wage profiles in the (3 1-55) age group(X2). Of course, these are very much the same
sectors.
Since the average retirement age is only a little over 55in the rapidly growing sectors, a
significant proportion of workers below 55 areinduced (by severance pay and other benefits) to





























namely that turnover rates appeared to be larger for older Japanese workers insectors with higher
productivity growth (Table 6A) and with steeper wage slopes (Table 3A).
4. Another Control: A look at Japanese Plants Operating in the U.S.
In this section we summarize our findings on recruitment,job training, and wage
structures in a sample of 83 Japanese plants operating in the U.S. (JPUS). Details ofsampling
data and of analysis are described in Higuchi (1987A)
A popular view of Japanese industrial relations stressesdiscipline and company loyalty as
a cultural characteristic of Japanese workers which is reflected in low turnover. Thesteep tenure-
wage profile is ascribed to company policies of increasing wages with seniority as a reward for
loyalty and for disciplined effort. Our comparison of Japanese and U.S. labor marketsyields
fmdings that are consistent with the economic analysis of human capital investmentson the job,
especially under conditions of differential rates of technical change, without attentionto cultural
conditioning. Nevertheless, the cultural background of workers is not irrelevant. Thesystem of
economic incentives that we described may be more effectively implemented, whenfavorable
attitudes are engendered by the culture. A better perspective on the relativeimportance of the
cultural background is to observe effects of Japanese labor policies in the U.S.environment. For
this purpose we studied the behavior of American workers employed in JPUSplants. We
examine (1) whether there are differences in modes of recruitment and jobtraining between the
JPUS and American plants, and (2) if so, how these differences influenced individualwage
growth and job separation rates.
In our interviews we found that most of the JPUS plants apply, withsome modifications,
similar technology and production systems to those in theirparent plants. Both Japanese and
American managers in these plants stress the importance of job training. Orientationand job
training are used not merely to enhance a given skill but also to acquire job flexibility for rotation
purposes and to maintain good conditions of machinery without relying on outside experts.
According to Table 10, the proportion of workers who received training in thepast year
(1985) was about twice as high in JPUS than in comparable American plants. Thisproportion
was also about twice as high as the new hire rate in the JPUS plants, but the proportionreceiving
training in the American plants was less then the new hire rate. This means that JPUS plants
provide not only training for new employees but also continuing training and retraining for the
existing work force, Training costs per worker were over two times higher in the JPUS plants,
and over four times higher for new employees. Given the strong emphasis ontraining and its
specificity it is not surprising that JPUS firms make strong efforts to recruit more adaptable and
stable workers. Indeed, the recruitment costs are twice as high in the JPUS than in American21
firms. And the positive correlation between training and recruitment costs is clearly observable in
Japanese industries as well.
These findings, it should be noted, refer to production workers, not managers. As such
they are not small: $1,756ofrecruitment and training costs per year of a new employee in JPUS,
compared to $626 in American firms. Still, these are underestimates: opportunity costsof job
training (foregone productivity) escape the accounting. Similarly, recruitment costsdo not
include compensation for recruiters' and interviewers' time.
Wage rates are similar in JPUS and American plants, although average tenureis less in
JPUS which are newer (the oldest plant dates back to 1963). Total,labor costs per American
worker are about $2,500 (or 10%) higher in JPUS. Over $1,000 of the difference is due to
higher training and recruitment costs, and another $1,000 to higher fringes (unspecified),the rest
is accounted for by (rather small) periodic bonus payments.
Table 11 shows the rates of growth of wages with schooling, experience, and tenure for
JPUS, comparable American industries, and for U.S. and Japan in the aggregate. The estimates
are based on wage functions of the form we used before. Tenure wage growthin JPUS is over
twice as steep (3.3%) than in comparable American firms (1.4%), but lower than in Japan
(4.2%). Prior experience has little or no effect on wages (for workers over 30,who were hired
from other firms) in JPUS, in contrast to American firms. While prior experience is de-
emphasized in JPUS, selectivity at upper education levels is apparent among whitecollar
workers and managers. This shows up in the schooling coefficient of the wage equation which is
far higher for workers over 30 years of age in JPUS plants than in American firms: Since prior
work experience is less valuable in the JPUS plants whose technology and labor utilization differ
from those in U.S. plants, quality and education may have been used as a substitute in hiring
older workers for higher level positions.
Table 12 presents a comparison of turnover rates. As expected, all the rates are lower in
Japanese plants, despite the fact that they are more recent and have a much larger proportionof
younger workers. One seeming exception is the layoff ratewhich is not much lower in JPUS
then in the American plants. But the statistic is unduly affected by one large electrical machinery
plant which laid off 40% of its workers. Without this exception,the layoff rate is, like the quit
rate, about half as large in JPUS than in U.S. plants. Quite remarkably, asin the comparison of
tenure-wage slopes, the JPUS turnover rate is abouttwo-thirds of the distance from the higher
national U.S. rate to the lower national Japanese rate, as shown below in Table 13:22
Table 10
Training and Recruitment Costs in JPUS and in American Plants
JPUS American Proportion of worker
who received training 24.35 13.48
Last year (%)
Cost of Training per worker ($) 134.2 52.9
Cost of Training per new hire ($) 1000.0 215.0 Recruitment cost
pernewhire($) 759 411
Table 11
Percent Growth in Wage Rate Attributable toSchooling1
Work Experience and Job Tenure in the JPUS Plants.
American Firms and Japanese Firms (%')
U.S.(Non-Union
workers in Textile,Japan JPUS JPUS U.S Metal, Machinery(all md- (with bonus)(without) (all industries)and Food) ustries)
ALL AGES
Schooling 18.92 18.78 6.62 8.76 16.79(12.335 years) Experience 0.57 0.64 0.98 0.82 1.46(17.415) Tenure 3.33 3.23 1.54 1.49 4.75 (9.600)
UNDER 30 YEARS OLD
Schooling 9.74 9.06 6.05 8.53 14.39(12.655) Experience 2.23 2.16 1.79 0.49 3.76 (6.585) Tenure 5,25 5.00 3.69 4.02 6.36 (3.770)
OVER 30 YEARS OLD
Schooling 22.41 22.60 6.55 8.76 17.16 (12.170) Experience -0.19 -0.04 0.53 0.57 0.66 (23.110) Tenure 2.47 2.43 1.31 1.30 4.28 (12.550)
Note: The Percentage growth in wage rate attributable toschooling calculated by the equation a log W/ E =b+2CEis the simple average of meansyears of schooling in the U.S. and
Japan, which are shown in parenthesis (the common value is given to the above fivecategories). The percentage growth in wage rate attributable toexperience and tenure is similarly calculated.
None of these calculations takes account of marital status whichwas not available in the JPIJS data.23
Table 12
Turnover Rates in JPUSandin American Plants
us American
Annual Monthly AnnualMonthly
SeparationrateS 19.5 1.7 28.2 3.5
Quitrates 9.3 0.8 17.9 2.3
Layoff rates 7.3 0.7 8.6 0.9
Layoff rates (b) 1.6 0.1
Percent of plants
with layoff 16.1 55.0
(b) Excluding 1JPUS plant which accounted for 40% of all layoffs.
Table 13
Tenure-Wage Growth and Turnover in Three Environments
Japan JPUS U.S..
Tenure-wage
Growth 47 33 1.5
Separation
Rate (Monthly) 0.9b 1.7C 35C
Sources: a-Table 11.
b -the1985 Monthly Labor Survey.
c-Table 12.
We may conclude that the relation between the wage structure (the tenure-wage profile)
and turnover is similar in all three cases, but that the (transplanted) hiringand training practices
of Japanese firms account for about two/thirds of the differentialbetween the U.S. and Japanese
wage and turnover behavior.24
5.Summaryand Conclusions
The starting point of this study is the proposition that intensiveformation of human
capital on the job is the basic proximate reason for thestrong degree of worker attachment to the
firm in Japan. The greater emphasis on training andretraining, much of it specific to the firm,
results also in steeper wage trajectories, due to growth of skills inthe firm.
Several previous studies viewed the differences betweenJapanese and U.S. labor
markets in the light of the same hypothesis. We explore thisinsight more thoroughly by a
detailed use of micro-data for the two countries: Wemeasure wage profiles and turnover in age
groups, and we i the inverse relation between the two on industry sectors within each ofthe
countries. Numerical estimates of this relation permitus to conclude that about two-thirds of the
differential in turnover between the two countries isexplainable by the differences in the
steepness of the profiles.
As we indicated, the relation betweenwage slopes and turnover is indirect--attributable to
the effects of human capital formation on each. This is incontrast to theories of seniority wage
incentive schemes which encourage worker effort, therebypermitting reductions in monitoring
costs. In such theories, the effects of wage profiles--which risemore rapidly than productivity--
on turnover is direct. In our opinion, this interpretation of differences inwage profiles between
the U. S. and Japan is inappropriate, prima facie, in view of thetraditional reputation of Japanese
workers for discipline and loyalty to the firm. Moreover, there is evidencethat supervision plays
a larger role in the careers of Japanese workers--but thepurpose is to guide worker development,
and not to monitor shirking behavior. Neither do weagree with the view that cultural attitudes are
the major reason for the inter-country differences especially because thesystem we observe has
been changing over time. We do not deny that cultural factorsmay play a facilitating role.
The question remains why the emphasis on human capital formationon the job is so
much greater in Japan than in the U.S. Our answer is that suchemphasis is conditioned by rapid
economic growth. More specifically, Japanese labor policies in the firmrepresent adjustments of
worker skills and activities to very rapid technological changes of thepast decades.
Several indications lead us to this hypothesis: (1) The timing ofstrong reductions in
turnover during the 1950's, when economic growth accelerated in thepostwar period. (2) The
lack of deceleration in the wage profile of mature workers relative toyounger workers in Japan--
suggesting continuous training and retraining processes characteristic of rapid technological
change. (3) Actual obsolescence of skills reflected in larger declines (than in the U.S.) inwages
of workers who interrupt labor force participation for severalyear periods. (4) Earlier retirement
age in sectors with more rapid productivity growth in Japan. Research on U.S. data suggests25
that the more rapid productivity growth in an industiy the greater the demand for education and
training in it.
Using productivity growth indexes for industries in the U. S. and in Japan we test the
hypothesis that rapid technical change which induces greater and continuous training, is
responsible for steeper profiles, hence indirectly for lesser turnover. The hypothesis isconfirmed
on the sectoral level in both countries. We conclude that differences in productivity growth
between the U. S. and Japan account for 70- 80% of the differences in the steepness of wage
profiles, hence indirectly for the differences in turnover.
Finally, we try to standardize for the cultural background of workers, by observing a
sample of Japanese plants in the U.S. which employ American workers, and use Japaneselabor
policies in recruitment and training. We fmd that the steeper tenure-wage slopesand lower
turnover place this sample closer to Japan than to the U.S.--about two/thirdsof the distance.
The question whether these transplanted policies are profitable and may serve as a model
for American industry to emulate is not easily answered, certainly not within the scope of this
study. In answering such questions one should keep in mind that the JPUS ventures are highly
selective in regard to: tax advantages and other incentives provided by local governments to
induce their location, non-unionized and carefully recruited employees, and industrial activities in
which their parent firms excel.
FOOTNOTES
1Explicatedby Mincer and Jovanovic (1981).
2 References: Kuratani (1973), Shimada (1981), Tachibanaki (1984), Hashimoto (1981),
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985).
3 See Becker and Stigler (1974), and Lazear (1981).
4Someevidence is cited in note 26, below.
5 References in footnote 3.
6 In his survey of the steel industry, Koike (op. cit.) found that tenure lengthened over
that decade. A similar finding is shown by Saxonhouse (1976) for cotton textiles.
See Lillard and Tan (1986), and Section 3 below.
8 According to Koike's survey (op. cit.) there was a large number of rotations within
Japanese plants. By contrast he finds that rotation inU.S. firms is infrequent. Mary Brinton
(1987) emphasizes rotation as an important component of trainingin Japanese firms.26
9 Parsonsuses NLS data, Tan the CPS.
10 Similar findingsare shown by Lillard and Tan (1986) in CPS and NLS data.
Most studies of Japanesewage structures use the Wage Structure Basic Survey
(Shimada (1981), Hashimoto and Raisian (1985)). Thereasons for employing the Einthis
paper are as follows: (1) While the WSBS is an establishmentsurvey, the isa household
survey which is comparable to the PSID (Mellow and Sider (1986)suggest that there are
discrepancies between the estimated results ofwage equations in establishment data and
household data). (2) We were required toemploy micro data which contain information onwage,
job separation and other related variables at the same time, and the is the only nationwide
data source available in Japan which satisfies these conditions.(3) While the WSBS conducts a
survey of wages in June only for the employees in firms with more than 10 workerswho
worked for more than 18 days a month and more than 5 hoursa day, the covers annual
earnings and working hours of all workers.
121979 Econtainsa question about the annual working days. In addition, the
survey asked workers with more than 200 working days ayear and workers with less than 200
working days who worked regularly during thesurvey period about their weekly working hours.
But seasonal workers and day workers did notprovide information on their weekly working
hours. So, these workers are excluded from ourwage data because information about both the
annual working days and the weekly working hours isnecessary for calculating the annual
working hours. (These workers are included in the sample for theseparation equations). The
seasonal employees and the day workers account forjust 3.6 percent of the total employees in
non-agricultural industries. The annual working days and theweekly working hours were
answered on a multiple-choice form. The annualworking hours was calculated as the median of
the selected answers to both questions.
13 Workingage upper limits of 55 in Japan and 60 in the U.S. are comparable,as they
precede imminent retirement.
14 The humancapital interpretation of the coefficients is provided in thenote following
the description of findings. See Mincer (1974) for the theoreticaldevelopment.
15 Greaterhomogeneity in abilities, and/or larger inequality in opportunities inJapan
could lead to such differences (See Becker 1975,Chapter 3).
16 Cf. Koike (1984) and Brinton(1987).
17 For a discussion of this bias inthe wage-turnover relation, see Mincer and Jovanovjc
(1981).
18 A possiblereason is provided in the analysis of early retirement (section 3(b)).27
19 The notion of "proprietary" technological knowledge is stressed by R. Nelson (1981).
In an unpublished paper Hong Tan (1987) translates this notion into firm technology-specific
worker skills.
20 This appears to be an initial phase for technological adaptations in American industries
(Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1986). According to Saxonhouse (1976) the unavailabilityof skills
embodying new technology on the outside of the firm, led to majorfirm specific efforts to mold
worker skills in Japan in the 1950's.
21 This resistance, or fear that workers "will work themselves out of a job" is a common
theme in the industrial relations literature. As Koike (1984) puts it, the job rotation training
system in Japan produces a "deeper" career patternof company specific skills which underlies
worker attitudes toward technological change and their commitment to the company.
22Lfflard and Tan (1986), Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
23 We combined some of the indexes in order to apply them to the smaller number
(aggregated) of industries in our data sources (PSID in the U.S.).
24 These slopes were estimated by interacting industry dummies with tenure in the micro
wage equations shown before.
25 See Becker (1975), pp 73-74.
26 The R2 is .43 in 26 industries, excluding public utilities and textiles. Data are from the
1983 Survey on Welfare Facilities Systems for Employees, and 1983 Survey on Employment
Trend.
REFERENCES
Becker, G. (1975), Human Capital, 2nd ed., U. of Chicago Press.
Becker, G.S. and G. Stigler (1974) "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,and Compensation of
Enforcers," Journal of Legal Studies, 3,January.
Brinton, M.C. (1987) "Women Workers and Human Resource Developmentin Japanese
Firms," paper presented at the 1987 Association of Asian Studies Meetingin Boston.
Brown (1983), "Are Those Paid More Really No More Productive?" Princeton Working Paper
#169.
Bartel, A. and F. Lichtenberg (1987), "The Comparative Advantage ofEducated Workers in
Implementing New Technology," Review of Economics and Statistics, February.28
Conrad, K. and Jorgenson, D.W. (1985) "SectoralProductivity Gaps between the United
States, Japan and Germany, 1960-1979" Problemeund Perspektiven de.L
Weltwirtschpfljchen Entwicklug, Berlin, Dunckerand Humblot.
Gustalson, Siv (1977), 'Depreciation Rates of HumanCapital Due to Nonuse," mimeo,
Stockholm University.
Hashimoto, M. (1981) "Firm-Specific HumanCapital as a Shared Investment," The American
Economic Review, Vol. 71.
Hashimoto, M. and Raisian, J. (1985) "EmploymentTenure and Earnings Profiles inJapan,"
The American Economic Review, Vol. 75.
Higuchi, Y. (1987) "Labor Force Withdrawal,Re-entry and Wages by Educational
Attainment in Japanese Women," ColumbiaUniversity Center on Japanese Economy
and Business. Discussion Paper. No. 7.Paper presented at the 1987 Association of
Asian Studies Meeting in Boston.
Higuchi, Y. (1987,A) "A Comparative Study ofJapanese Plants Operating in the U.S. and
American Plants: Recruitment, JobTraining, Wage Structure and Job Separation,"
Columbia University Center on JapaneseEconomy and Business. Discussion Paper No.8.
Koike, K. (1984) "Skill Formation System in the U.S.and Japan: A Comparative Study" in
IbEnQrni Analysis of the Jananese Firm, editedby M. Aoki, North-Holland.
Kuratani, M. (1973) "A Theory of Training,Earnings, and Employment: An Application to
Japan," Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University.
Lazear, E.P. (1981) "Agency, Earnings Profiles,Productivity, and Hours Restrictions" Iii
Aneticpn, Economic view. Vol. 71.
Lillard, L.A. and Tan, H.W. (1986) "Private SectorTraining Who Gets it and What are its
Effects," Rand Corp.
Mincer, J. (1974) Schooling. Experience andEarnings. NBER and Columbia Press.
Mincer, J. (1983) "Union Effects: Wages, Turnover,and Job Training," in Research inLa
Economics, Supplement 2, edited by R. Ehrenberg, PAlpress.
Mincer, J. (1984), "Labor Mobility, Wages, and JobTraining," DOL Report.
Mincer, J. (1984A), "Human Capital and EconomicGrowth," Economics of Education
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3.
Mincer, J. and Jovanovic, B. (1981) "LaborMobility and Wages," Studies in Labor Markets,
edited by S. Rosen. The University ofChicago Press.
Mincer. J. and Polachek, S. (1974) "Interrupted WorkCareers: Depreciation and Restoration
of Human Capital," Journal of PoliticalEconomy, Vol. 82. No. 2.
Mincer, J. and Polachek, S. (1978). "Women's EarningsReexamined," The Journal of
Human Resources, Vol. 13, No. 1.29
Nelson, R., (1981), "Research on Productivity Growthand Differences," Journal of Economic
Literature, September 81.
Parsons, D. (1986), "Wage Determination in the Post-SchoolingPeriod," Ohio State, Center
for Human Resources.
Saxonhouse, G.R. (1976) "Country Girls and Communication AmongCompetitors in the
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry," in JIpaneseIndustrialization and its Social
Consequences, edited by H. Patrick, Universityof California Press.
Shimada, H. (1981) Earnings Structure and Human Investment:A Comparison between the
United States and Japan Keio Economic Observatory.
Tachibanaki, T. (1984) "Labor Mobility and Job Tenure,"in The Economic Analysis of
Japanese Firm, edited by M. Aoki,North-Holland.
Tan, H.W. (1987) "Technical Change and its Consequencesfor Training and Earnings," Paper
presented at the Labor Workshop at ColumbiaUniv.Table Al
Means and Standard Deviptjpns* of Variables
U.S. JapanU.S. Japan U.S. Japan (18-60)(15-55)(18-30)(15-30)(31-60)(31-55)
Log wage rate ** 1.4709.0301.308 8.696 1.564 9.191 (0.42)(1.58)(0.37) (1.51) (0.42)(1.59)
Schooling(E) 12.73 11.9412.83 12.48 12.67 11.67 (Year) (2.70)(2.49)(2.10) (2.32) (3.00)(2.52)
Totalworkexperience)16.30 18.536.24 6.93 22.1024.12 (Year) (10.93)(10.63)(2.66) (3.99) (9.60)(7.98)
Tenureatthecurrent 7.85 11.352.82 4.72 10.75 14.35 firm(T), (Year) (8.31)(8.94)(2.52) (3.61) (9.07)(8.99)
Separationrate(S) 0.166 0.0490.281 0.086 0.100 0.035 (0.377)(0.22)(0.45) (0.28) (0.30)(0.18)
Married(M) 0.8740.7570.814 0.382 0.910 0.938 (0.33)(0.43)(0.39) (0.49) (0.29)(0.24)
Sample size 8103 211402963 6881 5140 14259
Sources: The 1979 Japanese Employment StatusSurvey. The 1976-8 1 U.S. Panel Study of IncomeDynamics.
Note: *Figuresin parenthesis are standard deviations.
The Japanese samples consists of maleemployees. The U.S. sample consists of white male employees who are household heads.
**The Japanese wage rate is shown at 0.1yen/hour
The U.S. wage rate is deflated by the 1979-basedCPI (in dollars/hour)
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Table A2
Regressions of Male wage Equations in Japan and in theU.S.
(Log
Japan (1979 The U.S. (1976-8fl
Equation Type(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (D)
Age Group 15-55 15-55 15-55 18-60 18-60 18-60 18-60
Constant 3.511**4.414** 4.588**0.5185** 0.5752**0.5706** 1.0587**
E 0.5668** 0.4491** 0.4489**0.0198** 0.0144 0.01410.0070
(12.66) (10.15)(10.17) (2.13) (1.59) (1.56)(0.79)
0.0149** 0.0114** 0.0116** 0.0019** 0.0021** 0.0021**0.0026**
(-8.43) (-6.51) (-6.81) (5.26) (5.72) (5.74) (7.16)
X 0.0843** 0.0390** 0.0167**0.0347** 0.0237** 0.0231** 0.0233**
(22.37) (8.87) (3.35) (22.87) (14.33) (13.95)(14.30)
x2 0.0013**0.0007** 0.0003** 0.0006** 0.0004** 0.0004**0.0005**
(-13.71)(-6.85)(-2.93) (-14.87)(-10.96)(-10.72) (-10.90)
T 0.0629** 0.0491 0.02310.0158** 0.0137**
(14.80)(10.23) (14.16) (8.46)(7.40)








R2 0.098 0.129 0.134 0.268 0.305 0.3130.333
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values.
*: Significant at the 10 percent leveL
**: Significant at the 5 percent level.
The dependent variable is the log wage rate. E is thenumber of years of schooling, X is total work experi
T is tenure at the current firm, C is a dummy for a job changer,M is a dummy for a married person, U is a
dummy for a union member. In the Japanese data,the information of whether the worker is a union memb
non-union member is not available. Year dummy variables areadded to the above independent variables ft
U.S. equations. These coefficients are omitted in thistable.32
Table A2 (Continued')
Regressions of Male Wage Equations in Japan and in the U.S.
Japan (1979') The U.S. (1976-81')
Equation Type(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (D) Age Group 15-30 15-30 15-30 18-30 18-30 18-30 18-30
Constant 3.9588**4.4086** 4744** 0.3914** 0.5048** 0.4963**1.0806** (7.54) (8.34)(8.95) (2.14) (2.85)(2.79)(6.73)
E 0.5121**0.4456** 0.4395**0.0224 0.0099 0.0122-0.0093
(6.20) (5.37)(5.30) (0.81) (0.37)(0.46)(-0.38)
O.O138** 0.0117** 0.0118** 0.0017* 0.0020**0.0019** 0.0030**
(-4.34) (-3.67)(-3.72) (1.62) (1.97)(1.87)(3.32)
X 0.1138**0.0587** 0.0333* 0.0790** 0.0442** 0.422**0.0383**
(7.21) (3.31) (1.77) (7.51) (4.11)(3.90)(4.31)
x2 0.0035**-0.0016-0.00090.0036** 0.0020** 0.0019** 0.0016**
(-3.14) (-1.28)(-0.74) (-4.48)(-2.44)(-2.35)(-2.50)
T 0.0982** 0.0422* 0.0769** 0.0637** 0.0498**
(5.84) (1.71) (9.62) (5.81) (5.41)
0.0046** -0.0009 0.0052** 0.0041** .00030**
(-3.45)(-0.57) (-5.69)(-3.69)(-3.36)
C -0.1243 0.0340* 0.0366*
(-1.26) (-1.64)(-1.95)





0.055 0.0640.070 0.173 0.223 0.225 0.29333
Table A2 (Continuecfl
Regressions of Male Wage Equations in Japan and in the U.S.
Japan (1979 The U.S. (1976-8fl
Equation Type (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (D)
Age Group 31-55 31-55 31-55 31-60 31-60 31-60 31-60
Constant 3.4884** 4.4255** 4.281** 0.5871** 0.6538** 0.6115** 1.0833**
(10.11)(12.96)(12.55) (8.50)(9.72)(8.90) (15.16)
E 0.5396**0.4295** 0.4146**0.0182*0.01380.01200.0046
(9.75) (7.91) (7.66) (1.76) (1.37) (1.19) (0.45)
E2 O.0133** 0.0103** O.0099** O.0020** O.0021** 0.0022** 0.0027**
(-6.01) (-4.74) (-4.57) (4.76)(5.06)(5.30) (6.25)
X 0.0905** 0.0404** 0.0388** 0.0281** 0.0180** 0.0188** 0.0216**
(8.80) (3.94) (3.79) (9.73) (6.14) (6.42) (6.71)
x2 0.0014** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0004**
(-6.64) (-3.48) (-3.52) (-6.97) (-5.27)(-5.57)(-5.93)
T 0.0658** 0.0527** 0.0184** 0.01369** 0.0115
(13.54) (9.65) (9.98)(6.43) (5.25)
0.0009**..00005** 0.0003** 0.0001** -0.0001
(-5.80)(-3.39) (-4.19)(-2.02) (-1.32)
C 0.1398* 0.0836** 0.0855**
(-1.59) (-4.19) (-3.96)




0.089 0.130 0.136 0.216 0.260 0.266 0.27734
Table A3
Regressions of Male Separation Equations in Japan and in the U.S.
Japan (1982) The U.S. (1977-81)
Equation Type (A) (B) (A) (B) (C)
Age Group 15-55 15-55 18-60 18-60 18-60
Constant 0.2677**0.2102**0.4908**0.4689**0.4756**
(6.23) (4.90) (7.54) (7.43) (7.56)
E 0.0l50**-0.0043 0.0027 0.0075 0.0121
(-2.31) (-0.68) (0.28) (0.83) (1.34)
0.0003 0.000020.0007*0.0008** -0.001 1**
(1.31) (0.09) (-1.89) (-2.19) (-2.98)
X 0.0082**0.0017**0.0194**-0.0017-0.0018
(17.99) (2.80) (-12.51) (-1.04) (-1.07)
x2 0.0002**•0.00004** 0.0003** -0.0000-0.00000
(13.03) (-2.59) (7.48) (-0.13) (-0.14)
T 0.0156** 0.0377** 0.0361**
(-26.07) (-22.99)(-21.95)
T2 0.00037** 0.0010* 0.0010**
(21.25) (17.30) (16.66)






R2 0.020 0.050 0.063 0.137 0.142
Fval. onE 50.63** 12.58** 71.47** 47.06**48.86**
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-value.
*: Significant at the 10 percent level
**: Significant at the 5 percent level.
The dependent variable is the dummy for ajob separation. We exclude exitsfrom and entries into the
labor market. Consequently, job separation issynonymous with job change in our data. The total work
experience (X) and the tenure (T) is defined on the basis of the information in theprevious year of the
survey period. The nationwide unemployment rate (NUR) is that of white malesage 18-60 in each year.Table A3 (continued
Japan (1982 The U.S. (1977-8fl
Equation Type (A) (B) (A) (B) (C)
Age Group 15-30 15-30 18-30 18-30 18-30
Constant 0.5698** 0.3671**1.0871**0.9268** 0.9673**
(4.54) (2.97) (4.96) (4.41) (4.30)
E O.O5O4** -0.0056 -0.0490-0.0299 -0.0275
(-2.83) (-0.32) (-1.50) (-0.96) (-0.82)
O.0013** -0.00006 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0001
(2.15) (-0.10) (0.55) (0.14) (-0.04)
X 0.0154**0.0081**0.05O8**-0.0021 0.0033
(-7.06) (3.24) (-4.79) (-0.19) (0.28)
x2 0.0006**O.0004**0.0021**-0.00005 -0.0004
(2.85) (-1.65) (2.70) (-0.06) (-0.41)










R2 0.018 0.074 0.046 0.133 0.135
FvaI.onE 51.38** 29.08** 45.21**30.87** 31.04**
35Table A3 (Continue
Japan (1982) The U.S (1977-81)
Equation Type (A) (B) (A) (B) (C) AgeGroup 31-55 31-55 31-60 31-60 31-60
Constant 0.2134**0.1713** 0.3341 0.3164 0.3095
(4.95) (4.02) (5.15) (5.03) (5.02)
E O.0104* -0.0011 -0.0064 -0.0020 0.0045 (-1.64) (-0.17) (-0.73) (-.02) (0.53)
0.0002 -0.00003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005
(0.89) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.36) (-1.42)
X 0.0063** 0.0010 0.0084** 0.0048* 0.0043*
(-6.16) (0.98) (-3.07) (1.81) (1.71)
x2 0.0001**-0.00002 0.000080.0001**0.0001** (5.58) (-0.70) (1.41) (-2.24) (-2.20)











R2 0.004 0.039 0.017 0.114 0.120
Fval.onE 32.13** 11.06** 13.05** 11.21** 12.11**
36Table A4
The Coefficient of Industry Dummy in wage Equations and Separation Equation
The U.S
37
Note: *: Significant at the 20 percent level.
**: Significant at the 10 percent level.
The coefficients of Industry No.1 are zero because the industry isassumed to be base-industry for
estimation.
The coefficients of constant term, E, E2, X, X2, M, Unemployment (also C, T,T2, Union and year
dummy in wage equations) are omitted in this table.
The U.S. Industries classification: l.Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing.2.Metal prod. 3.Machinery, 4.
Transportation equipment, 5. Lumber stone work & Furniture,6. Food & Kindred prod., 7. Chemical
md. 8. Transportation and Communication Services, 9. Public utility,10. Retail trade, 11. Wholesale, 12.
Finance, Insurance & Real estate, 13. Publishing, Printing& Allied md., 14. Health care services, 15.









(cx) (B) (cx) (B) (cx) (B) Lr"v















10. 0.00628** 0.06231**0.02151** 0.09546**0.00913**
-0.03087
11. 0.00772**-0.00804 0.03950** 0.01869 0.00430*
-0.02436
12. 0.02113**-0.00170 0.04345** 0.02506 0.01806
-0.01639
13. 0.01239**-0.03012 0.03666** -0.06499 0.00903**
0.07939**
14. 0.00076 0.06661**0.03193** -0.04993-0.00252
0.08012** 15. 0.00465**0.06183**0.02249**0.07684*0.00742**
-0.02982




The Coefficient of Industry Dummy inwage Equations and Separation Equation
Japan
15-55 15-30 31-55
Wage SeparationWage SeparationWage Separation (Ind1T) (Ind) (IndT) (Ind) (Ind1T) (Ind) Industry (cx) (B) (B)
1. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. 0.00651**0.00424 0.03366**-0.02636 0.03754**0.00918** 3. 0.00079 0.00499 0.00134 0.03367*0.00776**0.01297** 4. 0.01135**0.01508* 0.01337** 0.00742 0.04787**0.01317* 5. 0.01007**0.02056**0.00640 -0.00174 0.05054**0.02416** 6. 0.00347** -0.00428 -0.00115 0.03277*0.02798**0.00075 7. 0.01099** 0.01458* 0.00808**0.06690** 0.03971**-0.00367 8. 0.01237** 0.01656* 0.00735**-0.01747 0.05215**0.01 180* 9. 0.01562** 0.01294* 0.02653** 0.04860* 0.03851**-0.00623 10. 0.00740** -0.00300 0.00865* 0.00033 0.04430**-0.00491 11. 0.01565**0.01932**0.02332**0.00596*0.04141** 0.01205* 12. 0.01346** 0.01603* 0.01566**-0.04110 0.04071**-0.01098 13. 0.01143** 0.01072* 0.00547 0.02908* 0.04497**0.02000** 14. 0.01235** 0.02158**0.01238**0.07268** 0.03654** -0.00893 15. 0.01705** 0.01172* 0.01505**0.07807** 0.01990** 0.01425** 16. 0.01612** 0.01084* 0.01464** 0.05395**0,01605** 0.00038 17. 0.01402** 0.00512 0.01968**0.04941** 0.04599**0.01885* 18. 0.01125** 0.00332 0.01329**0.07184** 0.04842**0.02234** 19. 0.01195** 0.02762** 0.01081** 0.02261 0.05293**0.01802** 20. 0.02732** 0.01835**0.04310**0.08956** 0.07425**0.00020 21. 0.02576**0.04535**0.00925 0.07955**0.06964**0.03064** 22. 0.01182** -0.00065 0.01982**0.05060** 0.03667** 0.01049* 23. 0.01357** 0.01285* 0.01274**0.05598**0.05225** -0.00123 24. 0.00900** 0.01331**0.00768* 0.03609** 0.04787** -0.00613
The Japanese Industries Classification: 1. Agriculture,Forestry & Fishing, 2.
Mining,3. Construction, 4.Food& kindred products, 5.Textileprod., 6. Lumber &wood prod., 7. Pulp, paper & paper work prod., 8. Publishing,printing &
Allied md., 9. Chemical & Allied md., 10. Ceramic, Stone &Clay prod., 11. Iron
and Steel, 12. Nonferrous metal prod., 13. Fabricated metalprod., 14. Machinery, 15.Electricalmachinery, 16. Transportation equipment, 17. Precision trade, 20.
Finance & Insurance, 21. Real estate, 22. Transport & Communication, 23.Public Utility, 24. Services.39
Table A5
The Coefficients of Industry Dummy x Tenure (INDiDfindIndustryDummy (TNDI1
in U.S Wage Equations
Age Group 18-60 18-30 3 1-60 Non-Union
(1 8-60
IND1T ND1 IND1T IND1 IND1TINDINDT IND
___________ (a1) (j) (a,.
1. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. 0.0040* 0.1054** 0.0319*0.05850.0105** 0.2476** 0.0066-0.0424
3. 0.0130** 0.2815** 0.00670.3558** 0.0132** 0.3357** 0.0137** 0.2111**
4. -0.00040.0944** -0.00290.1035** 0.00170.1443** 0.0014 0.070*
5. 0.0114** 0.2259** -0.00910.1322** 0.0159** 0.3389** 0.0136** 0.2210**
6. 0.00003 0.0568*0.00240.1237** -0.0022-0.02520.0070* -0.0275
7. 0.00260.0942** -0.0129-0.03990.0065* 0.1754** 00077* -0.0405
8. 0.0036* 0.0582* -0.01810.02550.0079** 0.1466** 0.00470.0405
9. 0.00170.0110-0.01810.0824* 0.0073** -0.0992 0.00520.0254
10. -0.0006-0.05000.00620.1183** -0.0008-0.05160.0020-0.0127
11. -0.00180.1870** 0.00140.1820** -0.00030.2415** -0.0004 0.1565**
12. 0.0181** 0.1657** 0.0245* 0.2328** 0.0163** 0.1685** 0.0178** 0.1107**
13. 0.0035* 0.0536*0.0046-0.06940.0065** 0.1227** 0.0082** -0.0605
14. 0.00220.0635* -0.0057-0.06400.0058* 0.1374*0.0051-0.0422
15. -0.00070.2417** 0.0320** 0.1428** 0.00360.3309** -0.00140.1769**
16. 0.0061** 0.1574** -0.01820.0831* 0.0111 0.2475** 0.0090** 0.1212**
Notes: Controls included are E, E2, X, X2, T, T2, M, U and year dummy variables.
Industries:1. Mining, 2. Foods, 3,. Textile, 4. Lumber, Stone and Furnitures,
5. Publishing and printing, 6. Chemical, 7. Metal prod.,
8. Machinery, 9. Transportation Equip., 10. Miscellaneous mfg.
11 .Trade, 12. Finance, Insurance and Real estate,
13. Transportation and Communication, 14. Utility,
15. Services, 16. Public Administration.Table A6
Productivity Indexes by Industry (% Growthover the PeriocD
U.S Japan 1960-79 1970-79 1960-79 1970-79
Industry Industry
1. Mining -0.46 -0.50 1. Agriculture -0.060.02 2. Foods 0.00 -0.03 2. Mining Ø34 0.11 3. Textile 0.33 0.16 3. Construct -0.13 -0.03 4. Lumber, Stone
and furnitures-0.01 -0.07 4. Foods -0.18 -0.17 5. Publishing &
printing 0.21 0.20 5. Textile 0.270.10 6. Chemical 0.13 -0.03 6. Lumber& wood 0.450.14 7.Metalprod. 0.03 -0.02 7.Pulp&paper 0.170.00 8. Machinery 0.27 0.12 8. Publishing & print -0.11-0.18 9. Transport Equip.0.13 0.05 9. Chemical 0.450.05 10.Misc. Mfg. 0.05 -0.03 10. Ceramic & Stone 0.26 -0.05 11. Trade 0.19 0.06 ii. Iron &Steel 0.180.06 12. Finance & Ins.0.08 0.08 12. Non-ferrous metal 0.010.02 13. Trans. & Com-
munications 0.21 0.11 13. Fabricated metal 0.480.12 14. Utility 0.00 -0.14 14. Machinery 0.25 -0.01 15. Services -0.05 0.02 15. Electrical Machinery 0.890.31
16. Transport Equip. 0.21-0.02
17. Precision Instr. 0.650.32
18. Miscellaneous mfg. 0.540.23
19. Trade 0.28-0.01
20. Finance & Insurance 1.190.43
21. Transport,& Comm. 0.610.19
22. Utility 0.19 -0.01
23. Services 0.00 -0.12
Source: Conrad and Jorgenson (1985)
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